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EASTERN

F.O.
371

1947

PALESTINE

FINE No. 46

pp. 9330 - 9722

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

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Reference: **FO 371** / **61791**

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UNTIL

1978

61791

		Palestine	E9330 / G
		EASTERN	2
103	31	Colonel Secretary's statement on Palestine.	
E 9330 / 46 19			
Beirut 712			
Dated 6 Oct Received 8 Oct.			
Last Paper. E9299		(Minutes.) Made Cabinet Distribution we are, I understand, committing the C.O.S. about the position of the T.J. forces	
References. E9254/46/9		D.S. Beirut Oct. 9	
(Print.)			
(How disposed of.)		No, we are, at this stage only consulting them generally on the implications for Transjordan of a withdrawal from Palestine. The Arab Legion presents a very difficult and delicate problem which must be considered separately.	
61791		  10.4	
(Action completed.) 25-15/10	(Index.) W.P.		
Next Paper.			

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Reference: FO 371 61791					

E/G

DIPLOMATIC SECRET DISTRIBUTION.

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D. 9.43. a.m. October 7th, 1947.
R. 11.40. a.m. October 7th, 1947.

R. 11.40. a.m. October 7th, 1947.

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Reference: **EQ 971**

FO 371 / 61791

<p>104 31</p>	<p>Palestine EASTERN</p>	<p>E9331 / G 4</p>
<p>E 9331 146 19</p> <p>BME O</p> <p>545</p> <p>Dated 7 Oct</p> <p>Received 8 Oct.</p>	<p>H.H.C.'s policy to Palestine</p>	
<p>Last Paper.</p> <p>E9330</p>	<p>(Minutes.)</p> <p>Make Cabinet Dir.</p>	
<p>References.</p> <p>E9254/46/9</p>	<p>Egyptian Sept.</p> <p>D.S. Reins Oct. 9</p>	
<p>(Print.)</p>	<p>RQ</p> <p>10/x</p>	
<p>(How disposed of.)</p>		
<p>(Action completed.)</p> <p>25.5</p>	<p>(Index.)</p> <p>Wf*</p>	
<p>Next Paper.</p>		

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E9331

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be
retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]
Cypher/OTP DIPLOMATIC (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

FROM BRITISH MIDDLE EAST OFFICE CAIRO TO

FOREIGN OFFICE

No. 545
7th October, 1947.

D. 4.41 p.m. 7th October, 1947
R. 8.37 p.m. 7th October, 1947

Repeated to Beirut
Washington
U.K. Delegation New York

IMMEDIATE

Your telegram No. 1847.

I saw Azzam yesterday and made perfectly clear to him firm intention of His Majesty's Government to implement policy contained in Colonial Secretary's statement of September 26th without undue delay. He said he quite realised this and also that he knew there was a great deal of feeling on the subject amongst the public in the United Kingdom.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington as my telegram No. 31 and to U.K. Delegation New York as my telegram No. 347.

[Repeated to Washington and U.K. Delegation New York].

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat].

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<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> 105 12/17 E 9338/46/C₁ Radio 1948 October 7th. </div> <div> Palestine EASTERN </div> <div> E 9338 / G 6 </div> </div>	
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> Last Paper. E 9331 References. E 9354/46/C₁ </div> <div> (Minutes.) H.H.C.'s Policy to Palestine Made Cabinet dist. his appears to have been useful in clearing the Egyptian Govt. misapprehensions. Egyptian Govt. 15/10 H.H.C. Cairo Oct. 9 P. J. Gurney V 10/11 B.S.S. 10.4 </div> </div>	
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> (Print.) (How disposed of.) </div> <div> </div> </div>	
(Action completed.) DF 15/10	(Index.) W.P.
Next Paper.	

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Reference: **FO 371** / **61791**

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DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Bowker D. 5.45 p.m. 7th October 1947
No. 1978 R. 9.6 p.m. 7th October 1947

7th October 1947.
Repeated to Bagdad
Beirut
Jedda
Amman
Damascus
U.K. Delegation New York
Washington.

IMPORTANT.
SECRET.
LIGHT.

Your telegram No. 1847: Palestine.

Since Prime Minister was leaving today for the meeting of the Council of the Arab League at Beirut I called yesterday morning on the Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who is leaving with him, and spoke to him on lines of your telegram No. 3318 to New York.

2. The Under-Secretary admitted that the Egyptian press had received His Majesty's Government's statement rather light-heartedly. He said that he understood the statement to mean that while His Majesty's Government would not finance the imposition of a non-agreed settlement single handed they would be ready to do so in participation with others. I called his particular attention to the paragraph in the statement which emphasised that in the event of a suggestion that His Majesty's Government should participate in imposing a non-agreed settlement they would not satisfy themselves beforehand of equitable nature of the settlement and amount of force required to carry it out. Under-Secretary asked what His Majesty's Government would regard as an equitable settlement. I said that speaking personally I supposed a settlement which fulfilled the basic principles of the mandate. The Under-Secretary said he thought the Assembly would reach no decision. I said that in that case His Majesty's Government would withdraw. He paid careful attention to my message, said that it was an important one and that he would pass it on at once to the Prime Minister.

Foreign Office please pass to U.K. Delegation New York, Washington and Amman as my telegrams Nos. 104, 59 and 85 respectively.

Beirut please pass to Damascus as my telegram No.136.

[Repeated to U.K. Delegation New York, Washington
and Amman].

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Reference:						FO 371 / 61791			

106 1947 31	Palestine EASTERN	E9449/G 13 OCT 1947 8
E9449 H 61 G F.O Min Mr. Burrows dated 9 Oct Received 13 Oct.	Palestine: Further message for Colonial Secretary	
Last Paper E9338	(Minutes) Bot. 13	
References		
(Print)		
(How disposed of) Tel New York 3392 ✓ 900		
(Action completed) 25/10/47	(Index) L.H.	
Next Paper		

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9

PALESTINE.

The Secretary of State has been considering whether it may not be necessary for the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in view of Rabbi Silver's statement, to make some further public pronouncement about Palestine. The object of such a pronouncement would be mainly to justify our actions up-to-date and explain the efforts we have made in the past two years to obtain a settlement. The Secretary of State feels that our efforts should not be allowed to go by default. It may be, of course, that other spokesmen in the United Nations or elsewhere may make these points, which would render it unnecessary for a British spokesman to do so. Or it may be better to hold a statement of this kind in reserve in case of a breakdown, when we should wish to define our final attitude.

The Secretary of State would, however, like to send Mr. Creech-Jones a line in the following sense, pointing out that we here are too far away from the scene to judge whether it would be desirable or not for him to make a statement in this sense in New York.

(1) The tactics of the Jews and the Jewish Agency must be denounced. Had it not been for virtual aggression of Jews against Great Britain, the Palestine question could have been settled.

(2) Our own proposals to the Arabs and Jews should be brought out as proof that we had a constructive contribution to make to the problem. It should also be pointed out that these proposals would have given effect to the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee. The Jews in fact turned down the recommendations of the United States experts.

(a) H.M.G. wanted independence for Palestine, but
could/

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could not bring themselves to use force of arms in order to establish a state on a racial or religious basis. At the Palestine Conference our object was a state based on common citizenship for all the communities, Arab, Christian and Jew. Our proposals also provided the best possible safeguards for a Jewish national home and ^{for} a cantonisation scheme which had worked well in other countries. Jewish immigration was to have been dealt with, during the interim period while the British Administration was still in Palestine, by arrangements which would give the Jews themselves a voice in them.

(b) We fulfilled our obligations under the Mandate by admitting 100,000 Jews into Palestine. At the Palestine Conference we suggested that immigration above this figure might be dealt with internationally. But the Jews contended that under no circumstances could the Arabs be consulted, even though it was their homes and their future that were affected. It was thus quite clear that Great Britain could carry the matter no further within the terms of the Mandate, and a reference to the United Nations was, therefore, the only recourse.

(c) We suggested a trusteeship for Palestine for 5 years, in order that the United Nations should be brought in, and that as trustee we should report developments to the United Nations year by year. We offered a plebiscite after 5 years and we were prepared to agree that if 5 years was too long a period for the trusteeship, it should be shortened. We were even prepared to consider partition on a reasonable basis, ^{though} we felt that the central administrative services should be kept on a coordinated basis.

P. Dixon.

3rd October, 1947.

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Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Page 1

Page 2

Minutes.

Palestine

E9449

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Please see below Mr. Dixon's minute about a further message which the Secretary of State wishes to send to the Colonial Secretary. We were subsequently told that the Secretary of State did not wish the proposed statement to be on such strongly anti-Jewish lines as are suggested in the minute.

It has been extremely difficult to suggest what form any further statement should take before we knew what the Russian and American reactions were going to be. We now have a telegram from the Delegation (No. 2830 of October 8th), indicating that the general debate may be closed tomorrow, so that we should try to get something off to-day. I attach a draft telegram, in which Colonial Office concurs.

PAB Burrows

9th October, 1947.

C.F.H. Warner

9/x.

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Td sent.

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9/x.*

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Revised Draft.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

SECRET.

U.K. Delegation,
NEW YORK.

Following for Colonial Secretary from
Foreign Secretary.

Your telegram No. 2773 [of October 4th:
Palestine]

No....

Date

Cypher

Diplomatic
Secret Dist.

In replying to criticisms, it seems
desirable to emphasise our own efforts,
particularly during the last two years,
to obtain a settlement. You will no doubt
emphasise the constructive proposals which
we made to the last Palestine Conference.
These would have provided the best
possible safeguards for a Jewish National
Home, and while providing for reasonable and
regulated immigration for a period of five
years which seemed to us to be within
the the absorptive capacity of the country and
did not open the doors to unlimited
immigration which we recognised would never
be acceptable to the Arab countries and which
would take no account of the economic
realities of the situation in Palestine.
The working out of our scheme would have
been subject to U.N.O. control through
trusteeship for five years which in our view
would have given a reasonable time to see
if ^{the} two communities would work together. It
became obvious that the Jewish Agency claim
could only be met by admitting the right
of one community to dominate the other
and/

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(13556) Wt. 49697-140 100m 3147 G.S.St. Cp 620

Registry
No.

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

B.A.B.B.
Draft.
U.K. Delegation,
New York.

Telegram.

No.

(Date)

Repeat to :— *Flag C*

Ex Clair.
Code X
Cypher.

Distribution :—

Diplomatic Secret

Copies to :—

F. O.,

October 1947.

Despatched

M.

MOST IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Following for Colonial Secretary from
Foreign Secretary.

Your telegram No. 2773 [of October 4th:
Palestine].

In replying to criticisms, it seems
desirable to emphasise our own efforts,
particularly during the last two years, to
obtain a settlement. You will no doubt
emphasise the constructive proposals which
we made to the last Palestine Conference.
These would have ~~given effect to the~~
~~recommendations of the Anglo-American~~
~~Committee and would have~~ provided the best
possible safeguards for a Jewish National Home
which not
without opening the doors to unlimited
immigration which we recognised would never
be acceptable to the Arab countries and which
would take no account of the economic
realities of the situation in Palestine.

The working out of our scheme would have been
subject to U.N.O. control through trustee-
ship *for free people which in our*
view would have been a reasonable basis

2. It would then seem appropriate to
bring out the fact that our efforts to find
a settlement have been thwarted by *the adoption of*
attitudes extremists ~~on both sides, whom the~~
~~moderates have been unable or unwilling to~~

~~control~~
we

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Both sides
~~control.~~ We still ~~do not~~ believe that ~~it is~~
~~were to abandon their more extreme demands, an~~
~~impossible to find a solution which would be generally~~
~~agreement could be reached which would meet the~~
~~acceptable to moderate opinion on either side.~~
~~reasonable requirements of both parties.~~
 Our undertaking to withdraw is the best possible

contribution to bringing ~~the moderates of~~ both
 sides together. U.N.O.'s efforts will also be
 judged by their success or failure in achieving this
 object. Unless U.N.O. is willing to impose and
 maintain a settlement ~~by force~~, *from* it will be ~~for~~ the
 Jews and Arabs *who will in fact* ~~to~~ decide whether we are able to
 hand over responsibility to an administration with
 a reasonable chance of survival or whether
 thousands of innocent people on either side are
 sacrificed to the destructive passions of ~~a~~ *The*
 comparatively few extremists.

3. Subject to what the Russian representative
 may say in committee, you will no doubt also call
 attention to the utterly cynical handling of the
 question by Russian propaganda, which has been
 crying out for our withdrawal and now uses our
 promise to withdraw as an argument for our
 political bankruptcy.

4. It will naturally be for you to decide in
 the light of the debate how and when to make any
 of the points suggested above.

5. We shall be most grateful for a full
 appreciation of the situation and of forthcoming
 developments as soon as you can see more clearly.

6. Urgent study is being made of the practical
 problems of withdrawal and we will send you guidance
 on this as soon as possible.

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Registry
No. ~~E9499/46/5~~

Draft.
U.K. Delegation,
NEW YORK.

Telegram.

No. ~~3392~~
Date ~~Oct-9~~

Cypher
Diplomatic
Secret Dist.

V. G. L. P. M.

17

9/10

Despatched 7.42 P.M.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

SECRET.

Following for Colonial Secretary from
Foreign Secretary.

Your telegram No. 2773 [of October 4th:
Palestine]

In replying to criticisms, it seems
desirable to emphasise our own efforts,
particularly during the last two years,
to obtain a settlement. You will no doubt
emphasise the constructive proposals which
we made to the last Palestine Conference.
These would have provided the best
possible safeguards for a Jewish National
Home, and while providing for reasonable and
regulated immigration for a period of five
years which seemed to us to be within
the the absorptive capacity of the country and
did not open the doors to unlimited
immigration which we recognised would never
be acceptable to the Arab countries and which
would take no account of the economic
realities of the situation in Palestine.
The working out of our scheme would have
been subject to U.N.O. control through
trusteeship for five years which in our view
would have given a reasonable time to see
if ^{the} two communities would work together. It
became obvious that the Jewish Agency claim
could only be met by admitting the right
of one community to dominate the other
and/

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and in view of the Mandate we were not in a position to accept responsibility for using British arms to enforce such a claim on the other community. In the light of the facts we strove to ~~get~~ equality in self-government.

2. It would then seem appropriate to bring out the fact that our efforts to find a settlement have been thwarted by the adoption of extremist attitudes on both sides. We still believe that if both sides were to abandon their more extreme demands, an agreement could be reached which would meet the reasonable requirements of both parties. Our undertaking to withdraw is the best possible contribution to bringing both sides together. U.N.O.'s efforts will also be judged by their success or failure in achieving this object. It will be the Jews and Arabs who will in fact decide whether we are able to hand over responsibility to an administration with a reasonable chance of survival or whether thousands of innocent people on either side are sacrificed to the destructive passions of the extremists.

3. Subject to what the Russian representative may say in committee, you will no doubt also call attention to the utterly cynical handling of the question by Russian propaganda, which has been crying out for our withdrawal and now uses our promise to withdraw as an argument for our political bankruptcy.

4. It will naturally be for you to decide in the light of the debate how and when to make any of the points suggested above.

5./

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
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5. We shall be most grateful for a full appreciation of the situation and of forthcoming developments as soon as you can see more clearly.

6. Urgent study is being made of the practical problems of withdrawal and we will send you guidance on this as soon as possible.



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Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK
(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3392

9th October, 1947. D. 7.42 p.m. 9th October, 1947

MOST IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Following for Colonial Secretary from Foreign Secretary.

Your telegram No. 2773 [of October 4th: Palestine].

In replying to criticisms, it seems desirable to emphasise our own efforts, particularly during the last two years, to obtain a settlement. You will no doubt emphasise the constructive proposals which we made to the last Palestine Conference. These would have provided the best possible safeguards for a Jewish National Home, and while providing for reasonable and regulated immigration for a period of five years which seemed to us to be within the absorptive capacity of the country and did not open the doors to unlimited immigration which we recognised would never be acceptable to the Arab countries and which would take no account of the economic realities of the situation in Palestine. The working out of our scheme would have been subject to U.N.O. control through trusteeship for five years which in our view would have given a reasonable time to see if the two communities would work together. It became obvious that the Jewish Agency claim could only be met by admitting the right of one community to dominate the other and in view of the Mandate we were not in a position to accept responsibility for using British arms to enforce such a claim on the other community. In the light of the facts we strove to get equality in self-government.

2. It would then seem appropriate to bring out the fact that our efforts to find a settlement have been thwarted by the adoption of extremist attitudes on both sides. We still believe that if both sides were to abandon their more extreme demands, an agreement could be reached which would meet the reasonable requirements of both parties. Our undertaking to withdraw is the best possible contribution to bringing both sides together. U.N. efforts will also be judged by their success or failure in achieving this object. It will be the Jews and Arabs who will in fact decide whether we are able to hand over responsibility to an administration with a reasonable chance of survival or whether thousands of innocent people on either side are sacrificed to the destructive passions of the extremists.

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2.

3. Subject to what the Russian representative may say in committee, you will no doubt also call attention to the utterly cynical handling of the question by Russian propaganda, which has been crying out for our withdrawal and now uses our promise to withdraw as an argument for our political bankruptcy.

4. It will naturally be for you to decide in the light of the debate how and when to make any of the points suggested above.

5. We shall be most grateful for a full appreciation of the situation and of forthcoming developments as soon as you can see more clearly.

6. Urgent study is being made of the practical problems of withdrawal and we will send you guidance on this as soon as possible.

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1947

PALESTINE

13 OCT

Registry
Number

159459/46/31

FROM Mr. Mathison

No. to Mr. Beith.

Dated 9 Oct.

Received
in Registry 13

Communication with Jerusalem

Has received complaint from
Jerusalem Secretariat, that all
copies of correspondence bearing
on Palestine question are not
repeated to them. I request that
this may be done.

Last Paper

9449

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Minutes.)

Noted

Stable
(Cable)
14/10

B.S. Beith
Oct. 15

P. J. J. J.
15/10

Stable

16.4

(Action
completed)

G. E. M.
24/10

(Index)

Stable
24/10

Next Paper

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23

I think we
have not sent
CO & Jerusalem
copies of recent
desp^s to & from
Amman & Jeddah
on Greater Syria.
Perhaps we should

do so.

I have spoken to C.O.
They do not wish us
to send copies of what
we receive, but of
anything we send
in future. *W.H.*

16. V

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61791



Colonial Office, *enter*
Church House,
Great Smith Street,
London, S.W. 1.

24

October 9, 1947.

My dear Beith,

We have had a letter from the Jerusalem Secretariat in which they tell us that on some occasions recently they have found themselves in difficulty because they did not have copies of communications from the Foreign Office to Middle East posts to which reference was made in replies from these posts repeated to Jerusalem. They have asked if we could arrange for copies of Foreign Office despatches and telegrams bearing on questions of material interest to Palestine, particularly the Arab League and the Greater Syria ~~issue~~ *etc* should invariably be sent to Jerusalem.

I know it is your practice as far as possible to repeat such telegrams to the High Commissioner or send us a copy of relevant despatches for onward transmission. In view of the Jerusalem letter however perhaps you could ensure that officers likely to initiate such correspondence should bear in mind the advisability of repeating it to Jerusalem. In the case of despatches and saving telegrams perhaps two copies could be sent to the Colonial Office with the request that one be forwarded to the High Commissioner.

Yours ever,

W.A.C. Mathieson

E 3.58

(W.A.C. Mathieson)

J.G.S. BEITH, 13 OCT

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*delete as necessary

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<p>107</p> <p>E9444 /46/C</p> <p>New York</p> <p>2863</p> <p>Dated 10 Oct</p> <p>Received 13 Oct.</p>		<p>Palestine</p> <p>EASTERN</p>	<p>E9444 /G</p> <p>13 OCT 1947 25</p>
<p>Last Paper.</p> <p>E9449</p>		<p>(Minutes.)</p> <p>277</p> <p>This was written before the U.S. statement was known.</p> <p>Ministry of Information</p> <p>Ministry of Information</p> <p>Confidential</p> <p>27. Being Oct. 13</p> <p>NB. Copies to Min. Defence, U/S Is. for the colonies, Sir T. Lloyd and Mr Trafford Smith Co. sent 18</p> <p>PP</p> <p>14/x</p>	
<p>References.</p> <p>E9449/46/C</p>			
<p>(Print.)</p>			
<p>(How disposed of.)</p>			
<p>(Action completed.)</p> <p>27-157</p>	<p>(Index.)</p> <p>147</p>		
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Reference: **FO 371** / **61791**

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2863

D. 11.06 p.m. 10th October, 1947

10th October, 1947. R. 6.30 a.m. 11th October, 1947

Repeated to Washington Saving

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Егича

Your telegram No. 3592.

Following for Foreign Secretary from Colonial Secretary.

Thank you. I will keep the points suggested in your paragraphs 1 and 2 in my mind for use on an appropriate occasion. At the moment I feel we should wait and hear what contributions the Greater Powers have to say on the problem but in any case it looks as if it may be desirable for me to intervene towards the end of the general debate (possibly early next week).

2. Owing to the delay of the United States Government in stating their position, and our ignorance of what it would be, it has been difficult to send you a useful estimate of probable developments here. Advance copy of their statement has only just reached me and is being telegraphed to you separately. Appreciation in present telegram of course relates to position as it is here now before contents of that statement become known.

3. Almost all delegations in discussion with us or in their contribution in the Committee fight have wa[gp. undec.] of the problem of enforcement and mutual commitments which may be involved. The Zionists, despite Silver's remarks in his speech to the Committee appear to be uneasy at this lack of practical support. At any rate Silver himself, when I saw him the other day, was most anxious that we should remain in Palestine to take a share, in association with other states, in the enforcement of partition. At the worst, i.e. if no force is provided, the Zionists are confident of obtaining approval for a recommendation based on the U.N.S.C.O.P majority plan. This would enable them to claim international sanction for an attempt to set up a Jewish state by their own strength.

4. The Arabs on the other hand claim to be sure of 16 votes against the majority plan. They hope either to secure

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a few more or to be saved by a sufficient number of abstentions to prevent a two thirds majority when the issue comes before the Plenary Assembly. They have been disappointed by strong rumors that the Soviet Union intends to support the majority plan (and possibly to offer means of implementing it). Their main concern at present seems to be to impress the Assembly with the appearance at least of a resolute determination to resist partition by force.

5. There continues to be much discussion as to whether Jews and Arabs can be brought to an accommodation immediately and I understand that this is the wish of the United States and efforts are being made. But the Arab attitude is stubborn at present and the Jews fear that such negotiation may prejudice their chance of getting the partition recommendation from the Assembly. Effort, though not too hopeful, will be made.

6. It is not easy to judge the accuracy of the Arab and Zionist estimates of voting. Many delegations have not yet declared themselves and will not do so until the United States have spoken. Of the four Latin Americans who have intervened in the debate so far two (including Uruguay) have expressed agreement with the majority plan and two have reserved their position.

7. I think that all delegations (including those of the Jewish Agency and Arab Higher Committee) and the press are becoming convinced that we are really planning to leave Palestine after a comparatively short interval. I shall lose no opportunity to keep this fact in the forefront of discussion.

8. I am watching developments on the main issue but meantime am taking the initiative in proposing a general settlement of European displaced persons, for which there continues to be a strong desire in the Committee.

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Minutes.

F Enter 28
(Sobson)

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9474

I attach draft tel to
New York & Washington on lines
agreed at a meeting with
Sir O. Sargent.

C.O. concur at the official
level. They are showing the
drafts to Mr Rees-Williams
(their new parliamentary Under
Secretary) but do not wish
us to delay submission here.

W.H. Furrows
J. Sargent 13. x

This draft is ~~the~~, I understand, to
be cleared with the Prime Minister before
despatch. P.H. 131x

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

3148 Wt. 26469/137 50m 9/46 (51) F.&S.

Draft Minute
from the
Secretary of
State

URGENT

PRIME MINISTER.

P.M/47/146

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16 OCT

I submit herewith for your urgent approval a draft telegram to the Colonial Secretary instructing him to make a further statement answering the implications in paragraph 7 of the U.S. statement on Palestine, (New York telegram No. 2861), about the extent of our responsibility for the administration of Palestine. I also submit a draft telegram containing supporting instructions to H.M. Ambassador, Washington.

I think that this action is necessary as paragraph 7 of the U.S. statement implies that we have some responsibility for the administration of Palestine until some alternative régime is set up. It would, moreover, appear that the U.S. Government have not fully appreciated our determination to withdraw our Administration as well as our forces from Palestine.

The question is very urgent, as the general discussion on the Palestine question may be closed in the next day or two.

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URGENT

P.A./47/146.

PRIME MINISTER.

I submit herewith for your urgent approval a draft telegram to the Colonial Secretary instructing him to make a further statement answering the implications in paragraph 7 of the United States statement on Palestine. (New York telegram No. 2861), about the extent of our responsibility for the administration of Palestine. I also submit a draft telegram containing supporting instructions to His Majesty's Ambassador, Washington.

2. I think that this action is necessary as paragraph 7 of the United States statement implies that we have some responsibility for the administration of Palestine until some alternative régime is set up. It would, moreover, appear that the United States Government have not fully appreciated our determination to withdraw our Administration as well as

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Reference:

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3. The question is very urgent, as the general discussion on the Palestine question may be closed in the next day or two.

14th October, 1947.

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Reference: **FO 371** / **61791**

COPY

Foreign Office, S. W. 1.

Draft Telegram to H.M. Ambassador, WashingtonRepeated to U.K. Delegation, New York.MOST IMMEDIATESECRET

New York Telegram 2861 /of October 10th:
Palestine⁷.

You will no doubt make known to the State Department the points in my telegram No. to New York. There are certain additional points which cannot properly be made in a public statement, but which I should like you to bring to the notice of the State Department.

2. I can hardly believe from Mr. Johnson's statement that the United States Government have properly thought out the difficulties of implementing a settlement on the lines of the Majority Report. We found it necessary to employ comparatively large numbers of troops to deal with Arab troubles in 1936 - 1939. Even if we need not take at face value threats of neighbouring Arab states to send armed forces into Palestine, it seems clear that Arab resistance in Palestine supported by volunteers, supplies and other clandestine assistance from outside would now be on a far larger scale, if anything like the Majority Plan was to be imposed. ^{by force} It is quite unrealistic in these circumstances to talk about internal order being maintained by a Volunteer U.N.O. Police Force.

3. Secondly, have the State Department thought of the length of time for which a settlement would have to be supported by force? There has been a tendency in many quarters to think of the implementation of a settlement ^{without the agreement of Arab & Jews} as a single act to be completed in a given number of months after which outside authority could be withdrawn. In fact/

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fact it seems clear that settlement on the lines of the Majority Report would be no more acceptable to Arab states after a few months or even say two years than it is now, so that Palestine would still be a trouble spot, disturbing the whole British and United States strategical position in the Middle East. This emphasises the danger of implementing by force a settlement totally unacceptable to one of the parties.

4. Another point which Mr. Johnson's statement seems to gloss over is long term as well as short term viability of the two States which the Majority Report envisages. The preceding paragraph suggests that the Jewish State would in the long run hardly be strategically viable. It is none the less true that the Arab State would so far as can be judged not be economically self-supporting over any period.

5. It should not be forgotten that our difficulties in administering Palestine have been enormously increased by the fact that certain Governments are taking no adequate steps to prevent illegal immigration and are thus contributing to the problem of maintaining law and order. This is going on even while the United Nations are discussing the Palestine question, and this can only increase the dangers and difficulties of the future.

6. The situation which will face whatever authority assumes responsibility in Palestine after a British withdrawal is being urgently studied.

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Reference:

FO 371

61791

COPY

Foreign Office, S.W.1.

Draft Telegram to U.K. Delegation, New York.

Repeated to H.M. Ambassador, Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

SECRET.

Your telegram No. 2863 [of October 10th: Palestine].

Following for Colonial Secretary.

Statement by United States delegate reported in your telegram No. 2864 [of October 10th] suggests that it may be useful for you to include some further points in your statement.

2. Paragraph 7 of United States statement seems to imply that we have responsibility for administration of Palestine until some alternative régime is set up in pursuance of an assembly recommendation. This is by no means our view of the situation. We do not think that even in the days of the League a mandatory could have been compelled indefinitely to continue administering a mandate against his will, or that he could have been prevented from resigning the mandate upon giving adequate notice of his desire to be free. Since the dissolution of the League it has been, to say the least of it, doubtful how far the mandates system retains any obligatory force and we do not think we can be regarded as continuing to administer except on a voluntary basis. What we have said is that in certain circumstances we shall not continue to administer it any longer. As there appears still to be confusion as to our intentions on this point and as it does not seem to be realised that we are determined in certain circumstances to withdraw our administration as well as our forces, it would be as well to rub in the implications of your first statement to the Committee. There is only one hypothesis on which we shall continue to administer Palestine, namely that/

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that the Jews and Arabs agree, in which case we shall be ready to stay for a limited transitional period to help them put the agreement into effect. If the Assembly fail to agree on a recommendation, or if they recommend a solution which is not acceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews, we shall not feel bound to continue to bear responsibility for administering Palestine until a settlement is implemented and we shall proceed to plan the withdrawal both of the British Administration and of the British forces. If the Assembly recommend international enforcement of a settlement which is not agreed by the Arabs and the Jews, we shall consider whether the settlement is sufficiently just and sufficiently easy to enforce to justify our participation in such international administration and such international forces as may be appointed to enforce it. The extent of our administrative or military participation would naturally have to be decided in the light of circumstances and in any case the responsibility for administration would not be ours. The existence of a U.N.O. volunteer police force would not make any difference to our determination to give up responsibility for administration.

3. It seems most important from our point of view that the Assembly should not vote on the nature of a settlement for Palestine independently of measures to implement it. We do not want to be faced with a recommendation for a settlement of which we should disapprove without the Assembly at the same time accepting responsibility for effective means of implementing it.

4. I take it that you will not at this stage take part in discussions on the substance of the UNSCOP majority or minority recommendations. There may be a time later on at which we could usefully offer our good offices in an attempt at bringing Jews and Arabs together. But the moment has clearly not/

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Reference: **FO 371** / **61791**

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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS



9625
10, DOWNING STREET,
WHITEHALL

COPY OF MINUTE BY THE PRIME MINISTER.

Reference: Foreign Secretary's Minute P.M./47
/146. submitting draft telegrams to Colonial
Secretary and to H.M. Ambassador, Washington
On United States statement on Palestine.

"Approved,

C.R.A.

14.10.47."

Copy also sent to:

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Reference: **FO 371** / **61791**

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~~Draft Telegram to H.M. Ambassador, Washington~~

~~Reported to U.N. Delegation, New York.~~

MOST IMMEDIATE

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New York Telegram 2861 [of October 10th:

Palestine] to Foreign Office

You will no doubt make known to the State Department the points in my telegram No. 34^(A) to New York. There are certain additional points which cannot properly be made in a public statement, but which I should like you to bring to the notice of the State Department.

2. I can hardly believe from Mr. Johnson's statement that the United States Government have properly thought out the difficulties of implementing a settlement on the lines of the Majority Report. We found it necessary to employ comparatively large numbers of troops to deal with Arab troubles in 1936 - 1939. Even if we need not take at face value threats of neighbouring Arab states to send armed forces into Palestine, it seems clear that Arab resistance in Palestine supported by volunteers, supplies and other clandestine assistance from outside would now be on a far larger scale, if anything like the Majority Plan was to be imposed. It is quite unrealistic in these circumstances to talk about internal order being maintained by a Volunteer U.N.O. Police Force.

3. Secondly, have the State Department thought of the length of time for which a settlement would have to be supported by force? There has been a tendency in many quarters to think of the implementation of a settlement as a single act to be completed in a given number of months after which outside authority could be withdrawn. In fact/

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Reference: **FO 371** / 61791

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not yet arrived and it would be dangerous if we were prematurely associated with any compromise proposals.

5. You will no doubt make such use as you think fit with U.S. and other delegations of ideas in my telegram No. to Washington. *I think that in any case you might make public use of the point about illegal immigration.*

6. With reference to your telegram No. 2898, just received, we cannot at the present moment give you even a target date indicating how long the withdrawal of the Administration will take. You will realise that this question, which is being urgently considered, will require careful study. Statement authorised above should, however, be enough for your present purposes. In other respects we agree with the line in your telegram No. 2898 which the present telegram will serve to amplify.

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Reference: **FO 371** / **61791**

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fact it seems clear that settlement on the lines of the Majority Report would be no more acceptable to Arab states after a few months or even say two years than it is now, so that Palestine would still be a trouble spot, disturbing the whole British and United States strategical position in the Middle East. This emphasises the danger of implementing by force a settlement totally unacceptable to one of the parties.

4. Another point which Mr. Johnson's statement seems to gloss over is long term as well as short term viability of the two States which the Majority Report envisages. The preceding paragraph suggests that the Jewish State would in the long run hardly be strategically viable. It is none the less true that the Arab State would so far as can be judged not be economically self-supporting over any period.

5. It should not be forgotten that our difficulties in administering Palestine have been enormously increased by the fact that certain Governments are taking no adequate steps to prevent illegal immigration and are thus contributing to the problem of maintaining law and order. This is going on even while the United Nations are discussing the Palestine question, and this can only increase the dangers and difficulties of the future.

6. The situation which will face whatever authority assumes responsibility in Palestine after a British withdrawal is being urgently studied.

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Reference: **FO 371** / **61791**

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Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

No. 10549

14th October, 1947. D. 8. 15 p.m. 14th October, 1947.

Repeated to U.K. Delegation New York No. 3469

MOST IMMEDIATE

SECRET

New York telegram No. 2861 [of October 10th: Palestine]. to Foreign Office.

You will no doubt make known to the State Department the points in my telegram No. 3468 to New York. There are certain additional points which cannot properly be made in a public statement, but which I should like you to bring to the notice of the State Department.

2. I can hardly believe from Mr. Johnson's statement that the United States Government have properly thought out the difficulties of implementing a settlement on the lines of the Majority Report. We found it necessary to employ comparatively large numbers of troops to deal with Arab troubles in 1936-1939. Even if we need not take at face value threats of neighbouring Arab states to send armed forces into Palestine, it seems clear that Arab resistance in Palestine supported by volunteers, supplies and other clandestine assistance from outside would now be on a far larger scale, if anything like the Majority Plan was to be imposed by force. It is quite unrealistic in these circumstances to talk about internal order being maintained by a Volunteer U.N. Police Force.

3. Secondly, have the State Department thought of the length of time for which a settlement would have to be supported by force? There has been a tendency in many quarters to think of the implementation of a settlement without the agreement of Arabs and Jews as a single act to be completed in a given number of months after which outside authority could be withdrawn. In fact it seems clear that settlement on the lines of the Majority Report would be no more acceptable to Arab states after a few months or even say two years than it is now, so that Palestine would

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Reference: **FO 371** / 61791

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Foreign Office, S.W.1.

Draft Telegram to U.K. Delegation, New York.

Repealed to H.M. Ambassador, Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

SECRET.

UK Del
New York

No 34/6/46
Date 6/11/46

Repeat-
Washington
(Most Immediate)

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Cypher

Dip. Secret

Copy C.O.

7 10 copies
most immediate
to H.M. Ambassador
U.K. Delegation
direct to Chiefs
of Staff Secretariat
as appropriate. Shaplet on

Your telegram No. 2863 [of October 10th: Palestine].
Following for Colonial Secretary.

Statement by United States delegate reported in your
telegram No. 2861 [of October 10th] suggests that it may
be useful for you to include some further points in your
statement.

2. Paragraph 7 of United States statement seems to
imply that we have responsibility for administration of
Palestine until some alternative régime is set up in
pursuance of an Assembly recommendation. This is by no
means our view of the situation. We do not think that
even in the days of the League a mandatory could have been
compelled indefinitely to continue administering a mandate
against his will, or that he could have been prevented from
resigning the mandate upon giving adequate notice of his
desire to be free. Since the dissolution of the League it
has been, to say the least of it, doubtful how far the
mandates system retains any obligatory force and we do not
think we can be regarded as continuing to administer except
on a voluntary basis. What we have said is that in certain
circumstances we shall not continue to administer it any
longer. As there appears still to be confusion as to our
intentions on this point and as it does not seem to be
realised that we are determined in certain circumstances to
withdraw our administration as well as our forces, it would
be as well to rub in the implications of your first
statement to the Committee. There is only one hypothesis
on which we shall continue to administer Palestine, namely
that/

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Reference: **FO 371** / 61791

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that the Jews and Arabs agree, in which case we shall be ready to stay for a limited transitional period to help them put the agreement into effect. If the Assembly fail to agree on a recommendation, or if they recommend a solution which is not acceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews, we shall not feel bound to continue to bear responsibility for administering Palestine until a settlement is implemented and we shall proceed to plan the withdrawal both of the British Administration and of the British forces. If the Assembly recommend international enforcement of a settlement which is not agreed by the Arabs and the Jews, we shall consider whether the settlement is sufficiently just and sufficiently easy to enforce to justify our participation in such international administration and such international forces as may be appointed to enforce it. The extent of our administrative or military participation would naturally have to be decided in the light of circumstances and in any case the responsibility for administration would not be ours. The existence of a U.N.O. volunteer police force would not make any difference to our determination to give up responsibility for administration.

3. It seems most important from our point of view that the Assembly should not vote on the nature of a settlement for Palestine independently of measures to implement it. We do not want to be faced with a recommendation for a settlement of which we should disapprove without the Assembly at the same time accepting responsibility for effective means of implementing it.

4. I take it that you will not at this stage take part in discussions on the substance of the UNSCOP majority or minority recommendations. There may be a time later on at which we could usefully offer our good offices in an attempt to bring Jews and Arabs together. But the moment has clearly

not/

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Reference: **FO 371** / **61791**

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not yet arrived and it would be dangerous if we were prematurely associated with any compromise proposals.

5. You will no doubt make such use as you think fit with U.S. and other delegations of ideas in my telegram

No. 1052 to Washington. I think that in any case you might make public use of the point about illegal immigration.

public

6. With reference to your telegram No. 2898, just received, we cannot at the present moment give you even a target date indicating how long the withdrawal of the Administration will take. You will realise that this question, which is being urgently considered, will require careful study. Statement authorised above should, however, be enough for your present purposes. In other respects we agree with the line in your telegram No. 2898 which the present telegram will serve to amplify.

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Reference: FO 371 / 61791

44

DIPLMATIC (SECRET)

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

D: 7.50 p.m. 14th October, 1947.

14th October, 1947.

Repeated to: Washington No. 10548 (Most Immediate).

MOST IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Your telegram No. 2,863 [of October 10th: Palestine].

Following for Colonial Secretary.

Statement by United States delegate reported in your telegram No. 2,861 [of October 10th] suggests that it may be useful for you to include some further points in your statement.

2. Paragraph 7 of United States statement seems to imply that we have responsibility for administration of Palestine until some alternative régime is set up in pursuance of an Assembly recommendation. This is by no means our view of the situation. We do not think that even in the days of the League a mandatory could have been compelled indefinitely to continue administering a mandate against his will, or that he could have been prevented from resigning the mandate upon giving adequate notice of his desire to be free. Since the dissolution of the League it has been, to say the least of it, doubtful how far the mandates system retains any obligatory force and we do not think we can be regarded as continuing to administer except on a voluntary basis. What we have said is that in certain circumstances we shall not continue to administer it any longer. As there appears still to be confusion as to our intentions on this point and as it does not seem to be realised that we are determined in certain circumstances to withdraw our administration as well as our forces, it would be as well to rub in the implications of your first statement to the Committee. There is only one hypothesis on which we shall continue to administer Palestine, namely that the Jews and Arabs agree, in which case we shall be ready to stay for a limited transitional period to help them put the agreement into effect. If the Assembly fail to agree on a recommendation, or if they recommend a solution which is not acceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews, we shall not feel bound to continue to bear responsibility for administering Palestine until a settlement is implemented and we shall proceed to plan the withdrawal both of the British Administration and of the British forces. If the Assembly recommend international enforcement of a settlement which is not agreed by the Arabs and the Jews,

/we

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Reference:						
FO 371 / 61791						

6. With reference to your telegram No. 2898, just received, we cannot at the present moment give you even a target date indicating how long the withdrawal of the Administration will take. You will realise that this question, which is being urgently considered, will require careful study. Statement authorised above should, however, be enough for your present purposes. In other respects we agree with the line in your telegram No. 2898 which the present telegram will serve to amplify.

②②②

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Registry
No. *E 9475/46/G*
9674

Draft

Sir A. Cadogan,
New York.

Telegram

No. *3471*

Repeat to:

Washington
No. *10552*
(Personal for
Ambassador)

Misc. Immediate

6/1/46

Distribution:

Diplomatic (Secret)
No further dist.

Except
Private & Defense
Chief of Staff.
in 8 am box

MOST IMMEDIATE.
TOP SECRET.

Despatched

M.

Following personal for Colonial Secretary
from the Foreign Secretary.

The Prime Minister and I discussed my
telegrams Nos. *3468* to New York and *10549*
to Washington before despatch and feel that
we must impress on you the difficulties
everywhere which make it impossible for us
to indicate publicly even a target date for
withdrawal. We regret that we cannot be
more helpful, but trust that you will be
able to meet the point by pressing the
firmness of our intention to withdraw failing
a settlement.

it
2. The position as I see/is that we have
gained the initiative at New York. Many
things may occur between now and the final
act of the Assembly. For example, if *it seemed*
that *we would be* *it would be*
partition were accepted by a two-thirds
majority of the Assembly all parties *may* *might*
begin reconsidering *their* position. It
therefore behoves us to hold ourselves ready
to meet any eventuality. The Russians have
not shown their hand about implementation of
partition nor have the U.S. except in an
ill-considered and ill-thought out manner.
When it comes to be realised what withdrawal
of British administration and forces really
means, Arabs and Jews alike may feel very
differently/

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48

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

(To United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)
No. 3471

14th October, 1947

D. 8.58 p.m. 14th October, 1947

Repeated to Washington No. 10552 (Personal for Ambassador)
MOST IMMEDIATE

~~MOST IMMEDIATE~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

The Prime Minister and I discussed my telegrams Nos. 3468 to New York and 10549 to Washington before despatch and feel that we must impress on you the difficulties everywhere which make it impossible for us to indicate publicly even a target date for withdrawal. We regret that we cannot be more helpful, but trust that you will be able to meet the point by pressing the firmness of our intention to withdraw failing a settlement.

2. The position as I see it

2. The position as I see it is that we have gained the initiative at New York. Many things may occur between now and the final act of the Assembly. For example, if it seemed that partition would be accepted by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly all parties might begin reconsidering their position. It therefore behoves us to hold ourselves ready to meet any eventuality. The Russians have not shown their hand about implementation of partition nor have the United States except in an ill-considered and ill-thought out manner. When it comes to be realised what withdrawal of British administration and forces really means, Arabs and Jews alike may feel very differently. (For your own very private ear Defence Committee will shortly consider all the implications involved.)

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Reference: **FO 371** / **61791**

635

1947

E

PALESTINE

E 9536

14 OCT

49

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E 9536/46/31

W. G. Weston

W. G. Weston

10, Oct

14

Return to Palestine of Evacuees.

Copy of letter from W. G. Weston to Sir
B. Jeffries, I.O., re returning to Palestine
British women and children evacuated some
time ago. Doc. not that it very practical,
having in mind probable general evacuation
of Palestine.

Last Paper

9474

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Minutes.)

Attention is drawn to this
point in the draft paper ^{on which} being
prepared for the C.O.S. It is
of course irrational to send these
families to Palestine when we
propose to withdraw shortly.
C.O. realize this and will not,
I think, push the question
of providing shipping space for
them

J. S. Burt
Oct. 14

(Action
completed)

(Index)

J. E. B. 16/10

14/10/48

Next Paper

9536

32538


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Reference:

FO 371

61791

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10th October, 1947

E 0538

With the compliments

of

14 OCT

MR. W. G. WESTON.

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FO 371 / 61791

51

Dear Jeffries,

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FO 371

5159

I have sent a copy of this letter to Hall-Patch, Foreign Office and Patrick, India Office.

Yours sincerely,

(W.G. WESTON)

Sir Charles Jeffries, K.C.M.G. O.B.E.,
Colonial Office,
S.W.1.

636

E

52

E 9538

1947

PALESTINE

14 OCT

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E 9538/46/31

Chancery

Washington

17/325/47

8 Oct

14 -

counter propaganda, US Press
 Report 40 letter E 736/46/31) outlined
 forwarded, will be kept until appropriate
 time on most press comment and news
 dealing with proceedings of Lake Success
 and future of Palestine.

Last Paper

9576

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

8, 60. ref
 ✓ Oct 16

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completed)

(Index)

5 E/29/10
 11/4/48

Next Paper

755-4

(Minutes.)

Mr Cable 16/10
 carry
 Mr Dept
 Trans Dept 16/10.

Copy copy ref.

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Reference:

FO 371

61791

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WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

8th October 1947

Ref: 15/325/47

SECRET

Dear Department,

We are most grateful to you for your letter E.7361/46/1 of the 9th September, and to Jerusalem Secretariat for their letter C.S.756 of the 18th September (copied to the Colonial Office), both in answer to ours to you of the 6th August (15/241/47) requesting material on Palestine which might be used by some reliable journalist here to counter misrepresentations about our policy and actions in recent months. The material which you and Jerusalem have provided is just what we were wanting and it remains now to find a suitable opportunity for making use of it.

2. At the present moment there is no very convenient hook on which it could be hung. Attention is concentrated upon the proceedings at Lake Success and upon the wider question of the future of Palestine. The attitude of H.M.G. having been made clear in the Colonial Secretary's recent statement, it is for the Palestine Committee of the Assembly to study the UNSCOP report and try to make recommendations. In the circumstances, and since the accusations which the material provided is designed to counter have for the moment faded into the background, it does not seem desirable, or indeed practicable from the point of view of "selling" the story to a journalist, to try just now to launch an article in the press. In order to obtain its maximum effect, the material should be made available when there is again considerable public interest in the matters with

/which

Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

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Reference: **FO 371** **61791**

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54

which it deals. This may occur should there unhappily be a further crop of terrorist outrages in Palestine or of incidents arising from the arrival of illegal immigrant ships, or should there be detailed criticism of British policy in the course of the deliberations of the Palestine Committee of the Assembly. In that event we shall now be in a very good position to refute the accusations made and we will do our best to get into print the facts which you and Jerusalem have been kind enough to provide.

3. We are sending a copy of this letter to Jerusalem and to the U.K. Delegation at New York, to whom we are also sending copies of the correspondence referred to in the first paragraph of this letter.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY

BA

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<div>108</div> <div>31</div>	<div>Palestine</div> <div>EASTERN</div>	<div>E9554 / G</div> <div>35</div>
<div>E9554 / 46 / C</div> <div>C08(4Y)124th M16</div> <div>Pin 3</div> <div>Dated 6 Oct</div> <div>Received 14 Oct.</div>	<div>Loss of AT(4Y)123 (Final): Palestine</div>	
<div>Last Paper</div> <div>E9470</div> <div>References</div> <div>E8409/46/C</div> <div>(Print)</div> <div>(How disposed of)</div>	<div>(Minutes)</div> <div>H. J. Zein</div> <div>Oct. 15</div> <div>R. J.</div> <div>V. 15/1</div>	
<div>(Action completed)</div> <div>2F20/10</div>	<div>(Index)</div> <div>W. J.</div>	
<div>Next Paper</div>		

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Minutes.

E9554

751

Dept. Att. 10-X.

Eastern Dept.

Cos(47)124H

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1 to 556

3. LOSS OF DOCUMENTS.

THE COMMITTEE was informed that a recent report^o approved by the Chiefs of Staff on Palestine, which had been sent for the information of the British Representatives on the Middle East Staff Committee, had been mislaid. A Court of Inquiry into its loss had been held, and Ministers had been informed of the facts owing to the possibility that the contents of the document might be publicised.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note of this statement, and of the action taken.

o J.P.(47) 123 (Final)

Nothing to be Written in this

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<p>109 31</p>	<p>Palentine</p> <p>EASTERN</p>	<p>EQ562/G</p> <p>14 OCT 1947</p> <p>57</p>
<p>EQ562 146/C</p> <p>Haj Reales</p> <p>H/2ed</p> <p>with Enlow</p> <p>dated 8 Oct</p> <p>Received 14 Oct</p>	<p>Withdrawal from Palestine:</p> <p>Administrative implications</p> <p>VAP/P (4Y) 39 (Revised draft)</p>	
<p>Last Paper (EQ24Y)</p> <p>EQ554</p>	<p>from draft (Minutes)</p> <p>10 Oct. 15</p>	
<p>References</p>		
<p>(Print)</p>		
<p>(How disposed of)</p>		
<p>(Action completed)</p> <p>25 15/10</p>	<p>(Index)</p> <p>WPA</p>	
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Mr Riches

Wes spoke about this. Could you take a look at it, particularly paras. 13 & 21, and let me have your dept's views. I understand that this preliminary draft will be considered at a further meeting and I could then express any views you may have

H.S. Bevis
Oct. 4

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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Mr Grey.

Paragraph 13 suggests that accommodation should be built in the Sudan in the course of 2 years for 4000 extra troops. ~~In general we should deprecate~~ activity of this kind in the Sudan as emphasising to both the Sudanese and the Egyptians our strategic interests in the Sudan rather than our purely altruistic objective of bringing the Sudanese to self-government. But if we are going to build up our position in the Sudan to compensate to some extent for withdrawal from Palestine and Egypt this is surely an ideal opportunity of doing so. Assuming that the Arab states do not decide to blackguard us for getting out of Palestine it would be difficult for Egypt to whip up their support against us if we could say that we were building barracks in the Sudan in order to enable us to carry out the policy of withdrawal from Palestine.

~~But we don't want to display our hand in the Sudan. we prefer to act in a more~~

Paragraph 21. I think it idle to hope for Egyptian co-operation over this. We maintain of course that under the 1936 Treaty we have rights of transit. But the Egyptians contest this, and indeed Article 17 of the Annex to Article 8 of the Treaty implies that so far as the western desert is concerned only a few officers in civilian clothes would be allowed to go there either in transit or for a visit. Moreover with Egyptian imperialism in full blast no Egyptian Government could run the risk of seeming to help us to build up our position in Cyrenaica.

The same paragraph (21) implies that large installations will have to be maintained in Egypt for some time in order to provide for the evacuation from Palestine. This in turn implies the retention of large numbers of troops. ~~Both these implications are hardly justified by what will be the probable course of events.~~

It seems to me we have been urging the army to keep & even accelerate the run-down of troops in Egypt and the political repercussions of this increasing the establishment would be considerable.

We must be careful about

So far it has been agreed that we should strengthen the existing force in the Sudan by the addition of some tanks & light bombers. No question has yet arisen of adding to our troops now but

Excellent wish for going ahead quickly - but we can't hurry.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

1 Bn. Cyprus
2 Bns. 1st M.A. Division
1 Ind Bn. Sudan

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Minutes.

17 OCT 1947

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are on

As regards Cyrenaica, it appears to be proposed to move some 16,000 troops (Army and R.A.F.) into the territory. It is not clear when they will have to be moved, but it is evident that, whatever date is eventually decided as the deadline for our withdrawal from Palestine, it will not be sufficiently far ahead to make it possible to defer preparatory action until after the future of Cyrenaica has been decided.

~~XX~~ It would, I think, be preferable if the move could be arranged in such a way that the Four-Power Commission of Investigation does not on its arrival in the territory discover a vast amount of military constructional work going on. On the other hand, if the territory is to be ready to receive these troops by the end of 1948, then something will have to be done to get these works started now.

But more important than the effect of the movement on the report of the Four-Power Commission is its effect on the Cyrenaicans. The Emir will, we hope, be settling down in Cyrenaica in the near future; but he is nevertheless in a rather difficult mood at the present time, and we shall have to be careful not to give him the impression that we are unduly strengthening our military control of the territory. We shall, however, have to inform him of the proposal to move troops from Palestine to Cyrenaica and, while we can at the same time explain to him the reasons for the move, it would help if we were able also to take him to some extent into our confidence regarding our plans for the eventual independence of Cyrenaica.

aica.
I.W. Bell
6/10

P.S. I think we are agreed that we are legally entitled to station as many troops as we like in Cyrenaica, but we should perhaps ask the legal advisers at some stage.

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From:- Major G.C. Meares

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

GREAT GEORGE STREET,
S.W.1. 61

Tel. No.: Whitehall 7000

8th October, 1947.

E9562

Dear Burrows

I enclose two copies of the
Joint Administrative Planning Staffs'
Revised Draft paper on the Palestine
problem.

The Directors of Administrative
Plans are taking the paper at 11.15 a.m.
on Friday 10th October in Room 70
(Third Floor) Ministry of Defence.
Perhaps you would care to be represented?

Yours sincerely

G.C. Meares

B.A.B. Burrows, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

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The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of *Mr. Bannister*

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 29

62

DRAFT
TO BE FORWARDED TO
THE SECRETARY

JAP/P(47) 39 (Revised Draft)

JOINT ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING STAFF

8th OCTOBER, 1947.

PRINCIPAL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS COMMITTEE

JOINT ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING STAFF

WITHDRAWAL FROM PALESTINE - ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS

Report by the Joint Administrative Planning Staff

1. In anticipation of instructions we have examined a letter^x from the Foreign Office to the Chiefs of Staff requesting an estimate of the length of time required to complete the withdrawal from Palestine. We have consulted the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office and the Ministry of Transport.

2. Our examination, at Enclosure, is in the form of a draft report to the Chiefs of Staff from the Principal Administrative Officers Committee.

X COS (47) 207 (0)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

8th OCTOBER, 1947.

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Draft Report to the Chiefs of Staff

The Letter

Comment

4. We have, however, assumed in this examination that circumstances will permit the withdrawal of our forces and stores to be carried out as rapidly as the administrative factors allow. We have also assumed that the civil administration would be withdrawn concurrently with the Services as areas are evacuated. If further reinforcements are sent to Palestine, or if the withdrawal is impeded by the requirement of maintaining law and order throughout the country or as the result of obstruction by the Jews, Arabs, or Egyptians, then our estimate of the time required will have to be extended.

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ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS OF WITHDRAWAL

5. The persons and stores requiring evacuation are set out in the following paragraphs.

Royal Navy

6. (a) Naval personnel and Admiralty Civilians to be evacuated will total approximately 130.
- (b) Stores remaining in Palestine.
 - (i) 350 tons of Naval Stores (including office machinery and furniture) for local maintenance.
 - (ii) 2,700 tons of non-explosive Mining and Torpedo stores. The Admiralty are considering the removal of these stores at an early date to the U.K.
 - (iii) 3-4000 tons of Boom Defence Stores. It should be noted that this primarily consists of the boom at Haifa which is laid and will require one to two months to raise with the facilities available in the Mediterranean. It is planned to ship this to Malta.

Army

7. (a) There are at the moment some 68,600 British, local and Colonial troops in Palestine requiring evacuation. It has been estimated that this figure would have run down to some 55,000 by 1st April, 1948.
- (b) Considerable quantities of stores are held in Palestine for the maintenance of our forces, but these could be eaten down before our withdrawal is completed. The stores at Rafa Ordnance Depot lie, for the most part, in Egyptian territory and we assume that the removal of stores from this Depot need not delay our withdrawal from Palestine. We estimate that the remaining stores would amount to some 50,000 tons. Of these some 23,000 tons should accompany the troops while the balance would have to be moved to the Canal Zone to be absorbed in the Depots there. In addition there may be 13,000 vehicles.

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12. We have assumed that the forces in Palestine will move, as far as possible, to the locations where they will ultimately be deployed. These will be:-

(a) Army

- (i) Cyprus - one brigade and ancillary troops (total 8,000).
- (ii) Sudan - one independent brigade and ancillary troops (total 6,000).
- (iii) Cyrenaica - one division less one brigade, ancillary troops (total 20,000).

The above figures include the existing garrisons.

Other accommodation available in the Middle East is insufficient so that the balance of the Army in Palestine will have to be moved to the U.K. where accommodation is available.

(b) R.A.F.

- (i) Malta
 - two Long Range General Reconnaissance Squadrons (650 personnel).
- (ii) Canal Zone
 - two Fighter Squadrons to replace mobile fighter wing earmarked for Sudan (500 personnel). These squadrons will later move to Cyrenaica.
- (iii) Cyrenaica
 - Maintenance Units and R.A.F. Regiment (2,000 personnel) rising with arrival of two fighter squadrons to a total of 2,500 personnel.

In addition our land forces in Egypt will be running down to the Treaty levels and we assume that it will not be politically feasible to increase the Egyptian garrison over and above these figures, other than by troops in transit to their final locations.

Cyprus

13. There is at the moment accommodation available or in course of construction for a total of 5,000 Army together with administrative installations etc. The balance could if necessary be accommodated in tents as a temporary measure during the summer of 1948, by the end of which the camps now used for illegal Jewish immigrants should be available for the garrison.

Sudan

14. Permanent accommodation exists for 2,000 British troops only and it would be necessary to build new accommodation for the balance (some 4,000). This accommodation would take some two years to complete subject to the necessary priorities, and the troops would have to be stationed in another country until it was ready, since the very hot summer climate of the Sudan precludes the use of tented camps. It is politically desirable that the build up should be gradual.

Cyrenaica

15. Without reference to the Middle East we are unable to estimate the amount of surplus accommodation available in Cyrenaica but we think that considerable construction will be required for the proposed garrison.

16. The poor port and communication facilities, the undeveloped water supply and the lack of local labour in Cyrenaica have recently been emphasised^x by the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East. Even if the bare minimum scale of accommodation (tented camps with hatted ancillaries) is accepted, we estimate that if work is started now it will not be possible to complete the necessary construction including roads, water supply etc. before the end of 1948 at the earliest, assuming that priorities are obtained for building materials and shipping. Married quarters could not be completed in this time.

17. We would emphasise that this construction work may have to be carried out to the detriment of other approved projects in the Middle East, in particular the construction of the store holding area in East Africa for stores ex Egypt. This will affect the rate of rundown in Egypt. We are unable, without reference to Middle East, to estimate the extent to which these projects would suffer.

18. If forces are to be evacuated from Palestine to Cyrenaica before the necessary construction is completed, then they will have to live in tents under active service conditions. The resultant hardships would be particularly severe during the winter, and the administration of the garrison will probably entail costly improvisation.

19. Unless a survey of Cyrenaica reveals a considerable amount of accommodation already available an adequate scale of accommodation for the garrisons would not be available before the end of 1948. Tented accommodation might be accepted from the middle of 1948 with emergency administrative facilities but before this time such living conditions would be extremely severe. So much so that we do not consider they should be justified in peace time. For example, there will be no piped water supply, electricity or cold storage.

MOVEMENT CONSIDERATIONSPersonnel Movement

20. It will not be possible to obtain an accurate estimate of the personnel shipping required to evacuate Palestine until the Service Ministries have completed their detailed examination of the consequent redeployment.

Provisionally, however, we estimate that personnel shipping will be required to move some 19,500 Service men and 5,500 civilians to the U.K. and some 41,000 Service men within the Middle East theatre. The latter figure might be considerably reduced if it were possible to obtain transit facilities through Egypt to Cyrenaica for a rail and road move. We do not however consider that the Egyptians would grant us sufficient transit rights to allow for an appreciable difference to be made.

x 173/CCL

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22. Vehicles and Stores If transit rights to Cyrenaica could not be obtained it would be necessary to move by sea some 4,000 Army and 500 R.A.F. essential vehicles and 20,000 Army and 23,000 R.A.F. tons of stores to Cyrenaica in addition to some 600 vehicles and 3,000 tons of stores to Cyprus. These moves would be oncurrent with the moves of personnel into these countries. By the use of all available naval and military L.S.T. from the Mediterranean and U.K. and such L.C.T. as may be in the Mediterranean, supplemented as necessary by commercial shipping, we estimate that at least three to four months will be required for the moves.

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Reference: **FO 371** / **61791**

24. We must draw attention to the recent announcement which has been made that in the interest of the morale and efficiency of the Palestine Administration that families of civilians can return to Palestine, which will add considerably to the problem of provision of shipping.

6751

25. In the first place approval is necessary for the size and location of the new Army and R.A.F. garrisons in the Middle East; especially in regard to Cyrenaica.

26. Time will be required for general and executive planning before it will be possible to start on the movement of stores and the withdrawal of units onto the coast. General planning could be undertaken now by Middle East in advance of a decision by the Defence Committee, but executive planning must await a decision on the date of withdrawal. We estimate that one month will be required for general planning and a further month will be required for executive planning and preparations. It is estimated that six months would be required for the packing and movement of spares, the dismantling of essential plant, and the gradual withdrawal of units and stores to the coast or the Canal Zone.

69

CONCLUSIONS

28. On the assumptions given in paragraph 4 above, we conclude from the examination of the administrative factors, that provided:-

- (a) the development of Cyrenaica is accepted in advance of a decision on its future status,
- (b) adequate priority for shipping is accorded, including naval and military landing craft. If withdrawal is to be completed before the end of May 1948, interference with the evacuation of India or the demobilization programme will result,
- (c) high priority for building material and labour is accorded,
- (d) adequate financial approval is given at once,
- (e) no interference is caused by Jewish, Arab or Egyptian opposition,
- (f) a delay in the rundown of our forces in Egypt is accepted,
- (g) that portion of Rafa Depot lying in Palestine need not be evacuated.

the withdrawal from Palestine could be completed some fifteen months from the date of authority being given, when temporary alternative accommodation could be provided except in the Sudan.

Alternatively, the most rapid withdrawal from Palestine could be achieved in eight months from authority being given.

RECOMMENDATION

2c. We recommend that

- (a) this paper be forwarded to the Foreign Office as an expression of the views of the Chiefs of Staff,
- (b) the draft telegram at Annex be despatched to the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East.

[illegible]

ANNEX

From:- Ministry of Defence

To:- Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East.

We anticipate that the Defence Committee will shortly take a decision to withdraw from Palestine.

2. We intend that the forces displaced from Palestine should be moved so far as possible to their ultimate peacetime locations. These will be:-

Cyrenaica	One division less one brigade two R.A.F. Maintenance units, eight R.A.F. Regiment squadrons and two fighter squadrons.
Cyprus	One brigade
Canal Zone	Two fighter squadrons.
Sudan	One independent brigade.
Malta	Two long range GR squadrons

The balance of surplus troops would return to U.K.

3. Since alternative accommodation for the Palestine Garrison does not exist at present temporary accommodation must be provided for them. The most satisfactory arrangement would be for temporary accommodation to be constructed now for garrisons in para second above at their final strengths. They could then assist in constructing their permanent accommodation.

4. We have estimated that it would be possible to evacuate Palestine in eight months from the date of a decision, but that it would take at least fifteen months to provide tented camps and hatted ancillaries.

5. If a rapid withdrawal is required, it may be necessary to move troops to Cyrenaica and Cyprus in advance of their accommodation being completed.

6. You should therefore prepare plans for the evacuation of Palestine, and the rapid development of facilities in Cyrenaica. We appreciate difficult conditions in Cyrenaica outlined in your 173/CCL, especially in regard to provision of administrative facilities and labour.

7. You should now limit movement of stores to Palestine and work on administrative projects there to immediate necessities for maintenance.

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		Palestine	EQ566 /G 71
10 1547		EASTERN	14 OCT 1947
EQ566/46/S		H.M.C.'s policy towards Palestine	
Lt Col Naddon H/Def with Burrows COS 1134/10/0/7 dated 10 Oct Received 14 Oct.			
Last Paper		(Minutes)	
EQ562		This action is hardly necessary, in view of the more realistic trend of comment both in N. York and the Arab Countries.	
References			
(Print)			
(How disposed of)		I submit a draft reply after consulting Mr Burrows and Mr Johnston of Services Liaison Dept.	
aft) Lt Col Naddon H/Def from Mr Burrows 22 Oct.		H.S. Davis Oct. 14 R. Parnham 16/x	
(Action completed)	(Index)		
25 24/10	W.S.		
Next Paper		The official and for views not action 1st 17.10.47 Shd. prefer to let it go. Strong well be useful at some stage to reinforce. 34092/	

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Reference: FO 371 61791					

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Tel. No.: Whitehall 7000

TOP SECRET

REFERENCE: C.O.S. 1134/10/10/7.

E 9566/46

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,

GREAT GEORGE STREET,
10th October, 1947 S.W.1

enter 73
Green

14 OCT 1947

Dear Burrows,

At the Defence Committee meeting on 29th September, 1947 (D.O.(47) 22nd Meeting) the Foreign Secretary referred to the recent announcement made by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in New York to the fact that H.M.G. would withdraw from Palestine unless some solution was found acceptable to both Jews and Arabs. He said that he was finding great difficulty in persuading the Jews and Arabs to take this declaration seriously and asked if the Chiefs of Staff could arrange for something practical to be done which would help to convince both parties that in making this declaration we really meant what we said.

The Minister of Defence stated his concern that nothing should be done which would prejudice our ability to maintain law and order if, for instance, it turned out that we would have to stay on for the transitional period.

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74

To meet this request the Chiefs of Staff propose to send the attached telegram to the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East asking for their views on the question and their recommendations of what action might be taken by them. Before it is sent, however, they would be grateful if the Foreign Office would confirm that such action is still required.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Colonial Office (Mathieson) to give him an opportunity of commenting also.

Yours sincerely
W. Budden.

B. A. B. Burrows, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

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75

From: Ministry of Defence

To: G.H.Q., M.E.L.F.

C.O.S.(ME)

October, 1947

Foreign Secretary has said that he is finding great difficulty in persuading Jews and Arabs to take seriously His Majesty's Government's declaration in U.N.O. to the effect that we would withdraw from Palestine unless some solution is found acceptable to both parties.

We have been asked if something tangible could be done to convince Jews and Arabs of our sincerity in this issue. There is no intention of pressing for reductions beyond those already planned but that by appropriate means, e.g., perhaps by non renewal of certain long term contracts, we could convey that we are now beginning to take practical steps in preparation for a possible early withdrawal. At the same time nothing should be done to prejudice our ability to maintain law and order both now and in the immediate future since we may have to stay during some transitional period of unknown duration.

We would like your views on foregoing together with what action you recommend.

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EQS66/46/9

Minutes.

76

The S. of S. wished that we should instruct HMRR in the M.E. to be on the look-out for any Arab approach to us over Palestine. I think this could with advantage be incorporated in a tel. giving general guidance.

I attach a draft, in which C.O. concurs.

J. H. B. Brown
15/x

C. H. Warner
15/x

J. H. B. Brown
Tel. approved by the S/S and despatched.
(MONTAGUE BROWNE) J. H. B. Brown
16/10

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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Registry
No.

77

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

F. O.,

October 1947.

Despatched 7 M.

B. A. B. B.

Draft.

Cairo 1925.
Bagdad 883.
Beirut 640.
Damascus 526.
Jeddah 422.
Amman 454.

IMPORTANT

SECRET

It may be useful to you to have an interim appreciation of the way the Palestine situation is developing and guidance for your contacts with the Government to which you are accredited and the press.

2. We are in general fairly satisfied with the effect of our undertaking to withdraw. This has allowed us at last to give up the unenviable position of protagonist and it has brought the Arabs and Jews and other Governments nearer to facing realities.

Our immediate object must now be to drive home the point we have made by convincing all

concerned that we really intend to withdraw and by hammering on the question of

implementation. If it is clear that we are not going to be responsible for enforcing an unpopular settlement and that the difficulties of doing so will

NOX B.M.E.O. 792.

(Date)

Repeat to:—

Washington 10668

Moscow 3182

New York (V.K. Del.) 3520

Jerusalem

in the absence of a settlement accepted by both Jews and Arabs or should the assembly fail to reach any decision, it is suggested that the present session be continued.

Distribution:—

Cabinet

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

in the absence of a settlement accepted by both Jews and Arabs or should the assembly fail to reach any decision, it is suggested that the present session be continued.

... makes it unfortunately less likely that/

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Reference: FO 371 61791

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B. A. B. B.

Draft.

Cairo 1925
Bagdad 883
Beirut 640
Damascus 526
Jeddah 422
Amman 454

Max B.M.E.O. 792

(Date)

Repeat to :—

Washington 10668

Moscow 3182

New York (UK Del.) 3520

Jerusalem

in the absence of
a settlement
accepted by both
Jews and Arabs
or should the
assembly fail to
reach any decision
at all

Excluded from
present
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Distribution :—

Cabinet

Copies to :—

F. O.,

17 October 1947.

Despatched 7 M.

IMPORTANT

SECRET

It may be useful to you to have an interim appreciation of the way the Palestine situation is developing and guidance for your contacts with the Government to which you are accredited and the press.

2. We are in general fairly satisfied with the effect of our undertaking to withdraw. This has allowed us at last to give up the unenviable position of protagonist and it has brought the Arabs and Jews and other Governments nearer to facing realities.

Our immediate object must now be to drive home the point we have made by convincing all

concerned that we really intend to withdraw and by hammering on the question of

implementation. If it is clear that we are not going to be responsible for enforcing an unpopular settlement and that the difficulties of doing so will be extremely great, there is more chance of a compromise involving con-

cessions by both sides of sensible consideration of the question in New York.

The best result from our point of view would naturally be that the Arabs and Jews should agree and should ask us to remain in Palestine for a limited transitional period to help them put the agreement into effect.

While American and Russian support for partition makes it unfortunately less likely

that/

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(13556) Wt. 43697-140 100m 347 G.S.St. Gp 620

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E. A. B. B.

Draft.

Cairo
Bagdad
Beirut 640
Damascus 526
Jedda 422
Telegram Amman 45

No. B. A. C. 71

(Date)

Repeat to :—

Washington 10668

Moscow 318

New York (UK Del.)

Jerusalem

in the absence of
a settlement
accepted by both
Jews and Arabs
or should the
assembly fail to
reach any settlement
at all
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Cypher. Session.

Distribution :—

Cabinet

Copies to :—

IMPORTANT

SECRET

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Palestine for a l
to help them put t
While American and
partition makes it

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No.
and address and to say person by name, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his
compliments to

and, by direction of the Secretary of State,
transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,

(1356) Wt. 44697-140 1000 307 U.S.S. G.P. 620

78

that the Jews will make any concessions, we should carefully watch for any sign of compromise on either side. It is perhaps permissible to detect a slight move in this direction in speech of Pakistan delegate at U.N.O. on October 13th, in the course of which, while reiterating his opposition to partition, he said that if this solution were agreed upon, boundaries should be so drawn as to include roughly the same number of Arabs in the Jewish State as Jews in the Arab State.

4. We may at some stage have the opportunity of using our good offices to bring Arabs and Jews together, but the moment for this has not yet come, and we must be extremely careful not to become prematurely associated with any compromise proposal.

5. It does not seem desirable to react very strongly to threats of direct action by Arab States. There seems in all their talk to be a good deal of whistling to keep their courage up. The most important thing from our point of view is that they should not attempt any direct intervention in Palestine while we are still in charge there and you should, if you think it desirable, recall to the Government to which you are accredited that we are of course continuing to be responsible for the administration of Palestine until further notice and that ^{meanwhile} any action prejudicial to the authority of the Administration there will in fact be directed at us. You should also, if you think it desirable, deny rumours that we have any secret arrangements with any Arab Government about action by Arab forces in Palestine after our withdrawal.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

SECRET
Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO HIS MAJESTY'S REPRESENTATIVES

AT:

CAIRO No. 1925
BAGDAD No. 883
BEIRUT No. 640
DAMASCUS No. 526

KARACHI (via C.R.O.)
JEDDA No. 422
AMMAN No. 454
BRITISH MIDDLE EAST OFFICE CAIRO NO. 772

16th October, 1947

D. 7.30 a.m. 17th October, 1947

Repeated to Washington No. 10668,

Moscow No. 3182

United Kingdom Delegation New York No. 3520
Jerusalem

IMPORTANT
SECRET

It may be useful to you to have an interim appreciation of the way the Palestine situation is developing and guidance for your contacts with the Government to which you are accredited and the press.

2. We are in general fairly satisfied with the effect of our undertaking to withdraw. This has allowed us at last to give up the unevitable position of protagonist and it has brought the Arabs and Jews and other Governments nearer to facing realities. Our immediate object must now be to drive home the point we have made by convincing all concerned that we really intend to withdraw in the absence of a settlement accepted by both Jews and Arabs or should the Assembly fail to reach any settlement at all during its present session. If it is clear that we are not going to be responsible for enforcing an unpopular settlement and that the difficulties of doing so will be extremely great, there is more chance of a compromise involving concessions by both sides and of sensible consideration of the question in New York.

3. The best result from our point of view would naturally be that the Arabs and Jews should agree and should ask us to remain in Palestine for a limited transitional period to help them put the agreement into effect. While American and Russian support for partition makes it unfortunately less likely that the Jews will make any concessions, we should carefully watch for any sign of compromise on either side. It is perhaps permissible to detect a slight move in this direction in speech of Pakistan delegate at United Nations on October 13th, in the course of which, while reiterating his opposition to partition, he said that if this solution were agreed upon, boundaries should be so drawn as to include roughly the same number of Arabs in the Jewish State as Jews in the Arab State.

4. We may at some stage have the opportunity of using our good offices to bring Arabs and Jews together, but the moment for this has not yet come, and we must be extremely careful not to become prematurely associated with any

compromise

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(2)

compromise proposal.

5. It does not seem desirable to react very strongly to threats of direct action by Arab States. There seems in all their talk to be a good deal of whistling to keep their courage up. The most important thing from our point of view is that they should not attempt any direct intervention in Palestine while we are still in charge there and you should, if you think it desirable, recall to the Government to which you are accredited that we are of course continuing to be responsible for the administration of Palestine until further notice and that meanwhile any action prejudicial to the authority of the Administration there will in fact be directed at us. You should also, if you think it desirable, deny rumours that we have any secret arrangements with any Arab Government about action by Arab forces in Palestine after our withdrawal.

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No. E9566 / 46 / GOUT FILE

October 1947.

Draft.

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JGSB

Lt.-Col. T. Haddon,
Ministry of Defence.

(from Mr. Burrows)

NB. Private Sec. a
w/ may be informed of
the altered sense of
the draft reply. they
agree JB.
JB - Oct. 14 Oct. 20

CMCA 16/10.

Private Sec 7

S. L. Dewar

De 11/03

 $\sqrt{16/x}$

13023

See minute

In your ~~top secret~~ letter of October 10th, you enquired whether we still thought it necessary to ask the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, for their views on the best means of making clear to all concerned our intention of withdrawing from Palestine.

Although preliminary reactions to the Colonial Secretary's statement of September 26th were sceptical, later reports from New York and from the Arab countries suggest that our statement of policy is ^{now} being increasingly accepted as genuine. ^{and entire} ~~increased~~ ^{has also} ~~alleged~~ emphasis will ^{been} ~~be~~ given to our intentions in later statements ^a by the British Delegation at New York.

In these circumstances I doubt whether any further action in the shape of the ~~draft telegram you enclosed is required.~~

I am sorry that our
reply has been delayed but
we have been giving

Carole

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Reference:

FO 371

5155

82

Careful consideration to
the question. On balance
we now agree that the
telegram should be sent,
in spite of the fact that
the original scepticism
with which ~~the~~ ^{Mr. G's} statement
was received has been
considerably modified.
It may well be useful
at some stage to reinforce
our statements by confirm-
-atory action on the spot.

BAG

20-X

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OUT FILE

Dear Haddon

I am sorry that our reply has been delayed but we have been giving careful consideration to the question. On balance we now agree that the telegram should be sent, in spite of the fact that the original scepticism with which His Majesty's Government's statement was received has been considerably modified. It may well be useful at some stage to reinforce our statements by confirmatory action on the spot.

Yours sincerely
Sd.

(W. A. B. Burrows)

Lieutenant-Colonel
T. Haddon,
Ministry of Defence.

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<p>111</p> <p>E9540/46/C</p> <p>New York 2898 dated 13 Oct Received 14 Oct</p>	<p>Palestine EASTERN</p>	<p>E9540 /G 84</p>
	<p>Palestine : U.S. Statement on 11 Oct</p>	
<p>Last Paper. E9566</p>	<p>(Minutes.)</p> <p>I understand that a reply has been despatched</p>	
<p>References.</p>	<p>See within:</p> <p style="text-align: right;">J.S. Smith Oct. 14</p>	
<p>(Print.)</p>	<p>A) C.R.O. Command (Tel) 822 of 15/10</p> <p>B) C.R.O. Command (Tel) 823 of 15/10</p> <p>C) C.R.O. Command (Tel) 844 of 12/11</p>	
<p>(How disposed of.)</p>		
<p>(Action completed.)</p> <p>25/10</p>	<p>(Index.)</p> <p>Wgs.</p>	
<p>Next Paper.</p>		

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DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

D. 2.27 p.m. 13th October, 1947.

R. 9.00 p.m. 13th October, 1947.

TOP SECRET

[Begins.]

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FO 371

5155

3. We were assured by Commonwealth representatives that none of them would question decision of United Kingdom Government to withdraw from Palestine. They all agreed with me that, in view of the United States declaration, it would be desirable for me in a further statement to re-emphasise this intention and to make clear that, except in the unlikely event of an Arab-Jewish agreement, we should in no circumstances be prepared to continue to carry the primary responsibility for government in the territory. It was generally felt that it would assist in clarifying the situation and in bringing home to United States and United Nations generally our fixed determination on this point and the need for a more realistic approach by them, while it

might

might also help in breaking the obstinacy of the Arabs and Jews, if I could at the same time announce the date when, in the absence of a settlement, His Majesty's Government propose to withdraw. I think the time has come for me to ask for authority to do this.

4. I do not think that it is open to us, having submitted the Palestine problem to the United Nations, to vote either for or against the substance of any particular plan for its solution. But if the principle of a solution is adopted by the United Nations can we, as good members of the United Nations, refuse to participate with others in its enforcement if effective means of enforcement are devised and subject to the two essential conditions indicated in paragraph 9 of my original statement? We must, however, make it clear to the Americans and others that it is not sufficient for them to decide on any form of partition or on any other solution unless they are able to provide for means for its enforcement in the absence of Arab-Jewish agreement. Evatt, who is naturally anxious that his committee should as soon as possible agree on some recommendation, seemed to me to show insufficient appreciation of the importance and difficulty of this question of implementation.

5. Suggestion of a force of volunteers to assist in enforcement raises many obvious difficulties. I propose to impress on the United States Delegation the fact that the security force must be an effective organisation, which their proposal does not ensure, and that if they hope to secure a settlement on the lines of the U.N.S.C.O.P. majority plan they cannot escape assumption of a positive military commitment involving liability for employment of United States regular forces.

6. I shall be grateful for your authority to make an early statement on lines indicated above and in particular to know what can be said regarding date of withdrawal. I realise that it is probably too early to commit ourselves to a precise date; but if so I hope I may be authorised to name a provisional date which we are taking as our target. U.S.S.R. delegate is speaking today and there is now a long list of intending speakers so that my statement need not be made before Wednesday and could probably be postponed until Thursday.

[Copies sent to the Prime Minister.]

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Reference: FO 371 / 61791

E
With the Compliments of the
Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Relations.

20 OCT 1947

16 OCT 1947
E95Y0

This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher (typex) message and the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

CYPHER (TYPEX)

R.D.

FROM: COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE

TO: CANADA (GOVT.)
AUSTRALIA "
NEW ZEALAND "
SOUTH AFRICA "

(Sent 8.45 p.m., 15th Oct., 1947.)

IMPORTANT

TOP SECRET

D.No. 822 TOP SECRET

My telegram 20th September D.No. 777.

PALESTINE

Following personal for Prime Minister. Begins.

Implications of enforcement do not (repeat not) seem to us to have been given full weight in much of discussion in United Nations Palestine Committee. In particular United States statement seems to imply that we have responsibility for administration of Palestine until some alternative regime is set up in pursuance of Assembly recommendation. This is by no means our view of situation. We do not (repeat not) think that even in days of League a Mandatory could have been compelled indefinitely to continue administering a mandate against his will, or that he could have been prevented from resigning mandate upon giving adequate notice of his desire to be free. Since dissolution of League it has been, to say least of it, doubtful how far mandates system retains any obligatory force and we do not (repeat not) think we can be regarded as continuing to administer except on a voluntary basis.

SPECIAL

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Reference: **FO 371** / 61791

3. If Assembly recommend international enforcement of settlement which is not (repeat not) agreed by Arabs and Jews we shall consider whether settlement is sufficiently just and sufficiently easy to enforce to justify our participation in such international administration and in such international forces as may be appointed to enforce it. Extent of our administrative or military participation would naturally have to be decided in light of circumstances and in any case responsibility for administration would not (repeat not) be ours. Existence of a United Nations voluntary police force would not (repeat not) make any difference to our determination to give up responsibility for administration.

4. It seems most important from our point of view that Assembly should not (repeat not) vote on nature of settlement

for/

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FO 371 61791

Prime Minister's Private Secretary
Foreign Office P.S. to Secretary of State
Mr. F.T.A. Ashton-Gwatkin
Mr. J.P.G. Finch
Mr. I.P. Garran
Colonial Office Mr. Trafford-Smith
M/Defence Lt. Col. Parry for C.O.S.
C.R.O. (King
Charles Street) Mr. K. Barnes (4)

200 2W E
Any telegraphic retransmission of this secret cypher (publex)
telegram must be prepared in a one-time system.

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS
OUTWARD TELEGRAM FROM DOMINIONS OFFICE

TOP SECRET

CYPHER (PUBLEX)

R.D.

TO: CANADA (GOVT.)
AUSTRALIA "
NEW ZEALAND "
SOUTH AFRICA "

E9570

(Sent 11.55 p.m., 15th Oct., 1947.)

IMPORTANT

D.No. 823 TOP SECRET

My immediately preceding telegram.

PALESTINE

Following personal for Prime Minister. Begins.

We can hardly believe from United States Representative's statement to Palestine Committee, that United States Government have properly thought out difficulties of implementing settlement on lines of majority report. We have therefore instructed our Ambassador in Washington to make known to United States State Department points in my immediately preceding telegram, and in addition he is to bring to notice of State Department following problems.

(1) Strength of forces required. We found it necessary to employ comparatively large numbers of troops to deal with Arab troubles in 1936-39. Even if we need not (repeat not) take at face value present threats of neighbouring Arab States to send armed forces into Palestine, it seems clear that Arab resistance in Palestine, supported by volunteers, supplies and other clandestine assistance from outside, would now be on a far larger scale if anything like majority plan was to be imposed by force. We feel that it is quite unrealistic in these circumstances to talk about internal order being maintained by a volunteer United Nations Police Force.

SPECIAL

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(2) Duration of enforcement action. We question whether State Department have considered length of time for which settlement on lines of majority report would have to be supported by force. There has been tendency in many quarters to think of implementation of settlement without agreement of Arabs and Jews as single act to be completed in given number of months, after which outside authority could be withdrawn. In fact it seems clear that settlement on lines of majority report would be no more acceptable to Arab States after a few months or even say two years than it is now, so that Palestine would still be a trouble centre, disturbing whole United Kingdom and United States strategic position in Middle East. This, in our view, emphasises danger of implementing by force settlement totally unacceptable to one of the parties.

(3) Viability. It seems to us that United States statement glosses over long-term, as well as short-term viability of the two States which majority report envisages. It appears that Jewish State would in long run hardly be strategically viable and, so far as can be judged, Arab State would not (repeat not) be economically self-supporting over any period.

(4) Illegal immigration. We should wish United States Government to realize that our difficulties in administering Palestine have been enormously increased by fact that certain Governments are taking no (repeat no) adequate steps to prevent illegal immigration and are thus contributing to problem of maintaining law and order. This is going on even while United Nations are discussing Palestine question, and this can only increase dangers and difficulties of future. Ends.

Copy to:- Prime Minister's Private Secretary
 Foreign Office P.S. to Secretary of State
 Mr. F.T.A. Ashton-Gwatkin
 Mr. J.P.G. Finch
 Mr. I.P. Garran
 Colonial Office Mr. Trafford-Smith
 M/Defence Lt. Col. Parry for C.O.S.
 C.R.O. (King Charles St.) Mr. K. Barnes (4)

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Reference: **FO 371** / **61791**

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18 NOV 1947

With the Compliments of the
Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Relations.

13 NOV 1947

(This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher (typex) message and the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services.)

O U T W A R D T E L E G R A M

E95Y0 46/G

CYPHER (TYPEX)

R.D.

FROM: COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE.

TO: CANADA (GOVT.)
AUSTRALIA "
NEW ZEALAND "
SOUTH AFRICA "

(Sent 11.00 p.m. 12th Nov., 1947.)

IMPORTANT

D. No. 877 TOP SECRET.

TOP SECRET

My telegrams 15th October D. Nos. 822 and 823.

PALESTINE.

Following personal for Prime Minister for his most confidential information. Begins.

We have given further consideration to date of our withdrawal from Palestine and have now taken decisions on following lines.

2. General indication of United Kingdom Government's policy given by Colonial Secretary in his statements to United Nations of 25th September and 16th October remains unmodified, but we have decided that it is now desirable that at appropriate moment rather more of our plans regarding withdrawal should be revealed.

3. We have already made it clear that if there is agreement between Jews and Arabs, then our experience and administration will be available to help them to implement it. In absence of such agreement, however, we have decided that our authorities shall plan for final withdrawal of our Administration and troops from Palestine to be completed by 1st August, 1948. This decision is not (repeat not) intended to imply that we shall continue to be administratively responsible in Palestine, or that we shall maintain law and order there until 1st August, or that during this period our forces and Administration can be used for enforcing settlement which is not (repeat not) acceptable to both Jews and Arabs.

We still reserve right to lay down Mandate and to bring our civil administration/

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Reference: **FO 371** / 61791

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- 2 -

administration to an end at any time after it has become clear to us that Assembly has failed to provide an agreed settlement. Our forces would not (repeat not) subsequently be responsible for maintaining law and order (except as necessary for their own protection) or for any of the other normal attributes of government.

4. Our decision when to bring Mandate and civil administration to an end will depend on the nature of settlement which United Nations recommends, and probable effects of this recommendation on inhabitants of Palestine and of neighbouring countries. Only conditions on which, failing an agreed settlement, we would be prepared to defer termination of Mandate and Administration until date near to that on which all our troops could be withdrawn are that:-

- (a) we should have good reason to believe that there were going to be no (repeat no) disturbances in Palestine;
- (b) status quo, including all existing laws, could continue as before;
- (c) all attempts at illegal immigration should have definitely ceased.

5. Sir A. Cadogan has been given discretion to decide when and how much of these decisions he should reveal in a statement at United Nations, bearing in mind that premature statement might reveal our detailed intentions without any corresponding advantage. He is, at his discretion, also to inform United States representatives of substance of our decision. Ends.

Copy to:-

Prime Minister's Private Secretary	P.S. to Secretary of State
Foreign Office	Mr. I.A. Kirkpatrick
	Mr. B.A.B. Burrows
	Mr. J.P.G. Finch (4)
Colonial Office	P.S. to Secretary of State
	Mr. Trafford Smith
M/Defence	Lt. Col. Parry (for C.O.S.)

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Reference: **FO 371** / **61791**

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<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> 112 1947 E9644/46 1G </div> <div> Palestine EASTERN </div> <div> E9644 /G 94 </div> </div>	
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> 40'ion 5646 Dated 15 OCT Received 16 OCT </div> <div> Palestine: Conversation with Mr. Lovell </div> </div>	
Last Paper. E9570	(Minutes.) done copy to C.O. (Mr. Mathieson)
References. E9475/46/9 9625	J. E. Cable (J.E. CABLE) 17/10
(Print.)	D. S. Bevis Oct. 18
(How disposed of.)	R. G. Mann 20/10
(Action completed.) 25/10	(Idx.) W. H.
Next Paper.	Mr. Hayter suggested we might use a recent appreciation by the C. in C. in the M.E. of the forces required to enforce partition, to rebut the arguments in para. 3. I now attach a draft tel., which is a revision by the C.O.S. of a draft of ours. B. B. Sumner 23.10

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Reference: FO 371 / 61791					

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I think it wd. be an excellent thing
to send this off.

C. Alvarner
28/10

I think we have said
enough to the State Dept
for the time being. They
are beginning to realize
the difficulties of implementation
unless the more they study
the matter & this study
will be intensified when
the Pub. Conts. are appointed
the Assembly to work
out the details of the
plans & minor plans
will get down to work.
We must be careful
not to ~~over-argue~~
over-argue our own
negative case. Apart
from this I don't like
the idea of putting the
views of the local ~~people~~
against the ~~local~~ ^{local} ~~people~~
Chief which have not
so far as I know been
approved by the Chief
of Staff. & which might
lead to misused & distorted
by the Americans. 28/10

28/10
St. Dept
to see
//

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REVISED DRAFT TELEGRAM TO H.M. AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON
(REPEATED TO NEW YORK)

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET.

Your Tel No 5646 [of OW 15: Palestine]

Cypher
You could usefully employ following information to reinforce arguments recorded in paragraph 3 of your telegram under reference. ~~In addition,~~ You should of course make it clear that military examination was started independently of H.M.G.'s decision not to assume responsibility for implementing settlement which was not agreed by both parties and that this decision is not in any way modified.

Diplomatic.
Copy C.O. My J. J.
2. In addition to approximately 2½ divisions of troops, plus four squadrons and three flights of R.A.F. aircraft now stationed in Palestine, the Chiefs of Staff have estimated that, ~~in order to implement~~ *as regards* the Majority Plan of UNSCOP, appreciable reinforcement of Middle East garrison with appropriate Naval and air support would be required. *to implement it.* It would be impossible to implement the Minority Plan against greatly increased opposition from the Jews and it would be necessary to impose by force a colonial type of government, provided there was no appreciable Arab resistance, no reinforcement would be required but the present strength of our forces would have to be maintained.

JAB
23.4
3. View of the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, which has not yet been considered by the Chiefs of Staff, is that to implement the Majority Plan would involve reinforcements by additional formations, plus transportation personnel, technicians, pioneers, and administrative personnel and also additional R.A.F. squadrons, together with the necessary administrative and maintenance backing. Transportation personnel, technicians, pioneers and administrative personnel would also be needed to replace non-co-operative Arab labour. Commanders-in-Chief consider that forces required for implementing Minority Plan would depend on political background. On assumption that the *Minority* Plan would be ~~Jews but not seriously opposed by the~~ resolutely opposed by the Arab states, somewhat greater army

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reinforcements would be required than to enforce the Majority Plan and somewhat smaller air force reinforcements.

4. In the light of this entirely objective and unbiased assessment, United States authorities will understand why we regard their talk of a volunteer ^{police} force for ~~re~~ enforcement as totally unrealistic.

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Reference: **FO 371** / **61791**



Tel. No.: Whitehall 7000

TOP SECRET

REFERENCE: C.O.S. 1207/22/10/7

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
S.W.1

22nd October, 1947.

Dear Mayall,

I am sorry to be so long in letting you have the comments of the Chiefs of Staff on a draft telegram to H.M. Ambassador, Washington, which you gave me on Monday, 20th October, about the forces which would be required to implement a settlement in Palestine and which was not agreed by both parties.

I now attach a revised draft telegram incorporating amendments suggested by the Chiefs of Staff. You will see the Chiefs of Staff, in quoting the view of the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, wish to state reinforcements required in general terms instead of in the form of numbers of divisions and R.A.F. squadrons, etc. They think it would be improper to pass such details, supplied by subordinate Commanders, to the Americans since the Chiefs of Staff have not examined the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, estimates. If, at some later stage, the Foreign Office consider it necessary to supply the Ambassador in Washington with more precise estimates of the forces which would be required to implement an unsatisfactory solution, perhaps you would send me a further request indicating what is required.

*Yours sincerely,
A. J. Mayall*

A. J. Mayall, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

*London Dept.
I think this is as far as
the COS will go at present. LHM:mayall*

23/10

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E9672/46/31

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*delete as necessary

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<p>114</p> <p>E9721 /46/C</p> <p>Amman 310 Dated 16 Oct Received 18 Oct.</p>	<p>Palestine</p> <p>EASTERN</p>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; float: right; text-align: center;"> <p>E9721 /G</p> <p>18 OCT 1947</p> </div> <p>100</p>
<p>Palestine: Arab attitude</p>		
<p>Last Paper. E9673</p> <p>References. E9551/754/S</p> <p>(Print.)</p> <p>(How disposed of.) Rpd to 10840</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">(Minutes.)</p> <p>The most interesting point emerging from this tel. is the suggestion in paras. 5 and 6 that ^{neither} that King Abdullah and Samir Pasha the excludes the possibility of a Jewish state being set up. They are of course keen on getting the Arab residue.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">H.S. Bens Oct. 20</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Repeated to Washington. Copied as usual.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">See on E 9712.</p> <div style="text-align: right; margin-top: 20px;"> <p>RQ</p> <p>V 21/X</p> </div>	
<p>(Action completed.)</p> <p>25 29/10</p>	<p>(Index.)</p> <p>Wgk.</p>	<p>Next Paper.</p>

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E9721

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC SECRET DISTRIBUTION

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir A. Kirkbride
No: 310

D. 1.45.p.m.16th October 1947

16th October 1947

R. 6.10.p.m.16th October 1947

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York
Bagdad
Beirut
Cairo
Damascus
Jedda
British Middle East Office Cairo
Jerusalem, Savig

Secret.

Palestine.

Since his return from the [grp.undec ? meeting] of the Arab League in the Lebanon I have had series of informal talks about Palestine with Samir Pasha in which he went over the same ground as that covered in Beirut telegram 740 to you but with less exuberance.

2. The following point of interest emerged. When discussing Palestine the Arab States take it for granted that there is no question of their clashing with Great Britain or of intervening before a British withdrawal. They are not yet clear as to what form their intervention would take if fighting began between Jews and Arabs after a British evacuation. They appreciate the point that intervention of their armies against a Jewish State after partition had been accepted by the majority of the United Nations would make it difficult for them to remain members of that organisation and they are inclined to the plan of sending volunteers, arms and money to assist the local Arabs in the latter's rising in the Jewish State which seems to be taken for granted, while protecting Arab areas of Palestine if necessary with troops against possible aggression by Jewish forces. While admitting the possibility of early Arab reversals they seem to consider that in time the Arab people could wear the Jews down.

3. I asked Samir Pasha whether the ultimate allocation of surviving Arab areas of Palestine had been discussed by the Council. He replied that it was generally agreed that as the armies of the Transjordan and Iraq

would

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Reference: FO 371 / 61791

would have to bear the brunt of the fighting it was only fair that all Palestine should be united to Transjordan if it could be saved. Samir went as far as to say that the Mufti would acquiesce in such an arrangement. I do not credit this statement as a true picture and I do not believe that the other Arab States with the possible exceptions of Iraq and the Lebanon would be in favour of the Union of Transjordan and Arab Palestine under King Abdullah. The Mufti would resist such a solution to the last. I do however feel all the Arab States realise that the armies of Transjordan and Iraq are the only effective forces at their disposal. According to Samir, Nekrasni warned the Council that Egypt had so many other pre-occupations that its army would not be able to do more than hold the Palestine frontier. Yusef Yassin also admitted that Saudi Arabia could do little more than to send volunteers and money.

4. Samir and Saleh Jabr appear determined to act in concert if intervention in Palestine takes place and they are both anxious that they should come to some secret agreement with Great Britain before making any movement (see Beirut telegram 729 to you).

5. King Abdullah's latest idea seems to be that if the Arab States do send military forces to Palestine they should be under a unified command based Amman, in other words they should be under his control if this condition is not secured he may oppose even Iraq participation via Transjordan (see my telegram 306 paragraph 5). My personal conclusion is that King Abdullah would acquiesce to the formation of a Jewish State in Palestine providing he was certain that Arab residue came to Transjordan. He does not share the optimism of the others about the ultimate military defeat of the Jews.

6. Samir is inclined constitutionally to rush his fences (a habit he shares with Saleh Jabr) and this combined with wishful thinking, accounts for the sweeping nature of some of his statements. His talk of taking over the Jewish area of Palestine with Iraqi assistance must not therefore be taken too seriously. In this matter he is not in agreement with his master and if he is not careful he may find himself out of office because of his too full co-operation with other members of the Arab League Council. It is also to be noted in earlier talks with Pirie Gordon (see paragraph 7 of his telegram 275) Samir was willing to accept the idea of a Jewish State.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York, Bagdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda and British Middle East Office Cairo as my telegrams 9, 58, 95, 82, 57 and 46 respectively.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York, Bagdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda and British Middle East Office Cairo].

X:X:X:

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
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FO 371

61791

<div style="text-align: right;">1947</div> <div style="text-align: center;">1/5 31</div>		Palestine EASTERN	E9422/G 103
E9422/46 1G New York 2952 Dated 14 00 Received 18 00.		Palestine: Consequences of withdrawal.	
Last Paper. E9421 References.		(Minutes.) Ref attached. The High Commissioner has now gone on a tour and has made statements which are premially based on this guidance.	
(Print.)		J. L. Beins Oct. 23	
(How disposed of.)			
(Action completed.) 2F28/w	(Index.) 14/11	Next Paper.	

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Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO.1

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No.2952
17th October, 1947

D. 3.40 p.m. 17th October, 1947
R.10.55 p.m. 17th October, 1947

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Foreign Office please pass to Colonial Office and
High Commissioner Jerusalem.

[Begins].

Addressed to High Commissioner Jerusalem No.97 17th
October repeated Colonial Office.

Following for High Commissioner Palestine from Martin.

[Begins].

Reference Foreign Office telegram No.3496 to New
York repeated to you.

From point of view of situation in New York there is no
reason why consequences of withdrawal should not be made
public as suggested in paragraph 10 of your telegram to
Colonial Office No.1889. Effect of such publicity should
be salutary although we have not yet reached the stage here
when any move towards an accommodation between Arabs and
Jews is likely and there has so far been no indication of
softening in uncompromising attitude of Arab representatives.

2. Secretary of State regards it as most important that
Arabs and Jews should be pushed right up against the possible
consequences of their failure to reach an accommodation and
made to recognise that they must not lightly assume that it
will be a simple matter to arrange for a United Nations
administration or feel certain of remaining secure under
either a British or a United Nations administration. They
must understand that withdrawal before anyone can take over
from us is a serious possibility and that they ought to reckon
with its dire consequences.

3. As judged here it seems desirable, however, that
any statement on the subject should

(1) Be as little as possible open to the interpretation
that it is a warning to the Arabs and Jews to sharpen their
swords for the coming fray;

(2) Avoid the impression (given for example by press
reports

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reports of a statement attributed to a Foreign Office spokesman) that British authorities view in any lighthearted spirit abandonment of Palestine to anarchy and chaos and

(3) Not lend any support to suggestions that are freely being made in the press here that in concert with plans of Arab league His Majesty's Government are deliberately aiming at creation of a vacuum.

As regards (1) above it seems clear that a statement on lines you propose would place emphasis on effects of withdrawal in matters of everyday life rather than on possibility of disorders and bloodshed.

4. Please telegraph as soon as possible text of any statement you decide to make. We have only seen press report of statement you made on 9th October.

[Ends].

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office].

k k k

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Green
106
END

[illegible]

No. 5496
15th October, 1947

repaired to Jerusalem

Figure 6

Deputy High Commissioner for Palestine
No. 8478].

Following for Martin from Colonial Office.
High Commissioner's telegram to Secretary of State
No.1310 [Top secret] repeated United Kingdom
delegation for you. [Civil problems of withdrawal].

In paragraph 10 of his telegram High Commissioner suggests that consequences of our withdrawal leaving a vacuum should be made plain in stark detail to Arabs and Jews. We feel here that such a step would be salutary but would be grateful for your views on its desirability at present juncture in the light of the situation in New York. If you agree please telegram to High Commissioner (to whom this telegram is being repeated) with indication of best timing for High Commissioner's announcement which would no doubt be made to Arab and Jewish leaders in Jerusalem and also to the press there.

Foreign Office agree that if you see no objection High Commissioner should make statement on lines suggested.

K **K** **K**

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